We document the Chinese effects on international residential property price growth. We show faster growth of the housing prices associated with larger decline in recent past growth of China's GDP, larger increases in China's savings rate, or stronger rise in China's risks. These results are consistent with the notion of Chinese investing in overseas property markets when faced with less promising investment opportunities at home and when they have the means to invest offshore. These effects are stronger for countries where English is the primary spoken language, with better tertiary education quality, and that exhibit lower correlations between local property market price growth and China's interest rate.
Introduction
Chinese investment in overseas property markets is widely covered in the media 1 and draws attention from governments (e.g. the Australian, Canadian, and Singaporean governments have imposed restrictions on overseas property buyers). Anecdotal evidence suggests Chinese investment is significant 2 and affects other countries' real estate markets, economies, and societies. It has been considered as a potential external source of turbulence Based on quarterly data of 23 countries primarily from 1993-2015, we find the real residential housing price indices' growth is significantly negatively associated with the average growth of China's real GDP in the past four quarters. In addition, it is significantly positively associated with contemporaneous changes in China's savings rate (investible funds)
in the same year after controlling for common real estate explanatory variables. On average, international housing prices increase approximately 0.23% following a 1% decrease in China's GDP growth. Further, a 1% increase in China's savings rate is associated with a 1% increase international housing prices on average. Given the massive global value of residential real estate (Savills 2016), even a 0.23% increase plausibly represents a very large impact on the local economy 3 . Further, it is economically significant as, on average, a 1% decrease in China's GDP growth has the equivalent housing price impact as a 0.89% increase in the local country's GDP.
The GDP growth of the United States, the United Kingdom, or the aggregate of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom does not have such pervasive effects as those of China's GDP growth. We obtain similar results when we replace China's GDP growth with interest rates or consumer confidence expectations and China's savings rate with wealth growth.
These results are consistent with the notion of Chinese investing in overseas property markets when China has less promising domestic investment opportunities and they have the means (savings and wealth) to do so. These significant relations persist when recent economic 3 In this paper, the term local refers to one of the 23 countries we examine.
downturns are excluded or when separating the differential effect of the post-2007 period.
We also obtain similar results when controlling for bubbles in China's stock and property markets. The relation with China's GDP is prevalent, but relatively stronger for residential property markets in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Luxembourg, South Korea, and South Africa.
Concerning the conditions under which these relations are stronger, we obtain the following findings. First, the relations are more pronounced when economic risk is higher in China or when the media covers more Chinese risk/uncertainty stories. Second, the investible funds effect is more pronounced in local property markets with a lower correlation with China's interest rate. Third, the relations are stronger for housing markets located in Englishspeaking countries. Finally, there are more apparent Chinese effects in countries with quality tertiary education and local country real estate prices grow faster for China's top destinations for tertiary student migration when China is politically riskier.
We search major policy changes for international property buyers or key rule changes that affect the ease of Chinese capital outflows. We find that corresponding residential housing prices grow faster following a relaxation of capital outflows for Chinese resident from
China in 2007 and a relaxation for foreigners to purchase properties in Australia in December 2008. We also find that related housing prices grow slower following an imposition of a capital gains tax for overseas investors buying UK residential property in April 2015 and a restriction for foreigners buying properties in Australia in April 2010. However, as there are few major exogenous shocks to exploit for robustness analyses we are strongly cautious and conservative about generalisation of the results. 4 Our work is related to two strands of research. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 describes the methodology and states the hypotheses. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data
Our dependent variable is growth of housing price indices. We obtain the political, economic and financial risk ratings of other countries from the PRS Group and local and global numbers of risk stories and all stories from Bloomberg. Finally, the OECD provides country-level household debt, short-term interest rates, rental price indices, production indices in construction, and indices of permits issued for dwellings or residential buildings. Where necessary, we convert all series into real seasonally adjusted quarterly series using the seasonality dummy approach. For daily or monthly series, we use the average of all days or months in a quarter. The variable definitions are given in the Appendix. Table 1 shows the main variable summary statistics. Over the sample period from 1993 Q1 to 2015 Q4, China's real GDP growth is more than 10 times higher than for both local country and world real GDP growth. On the other hand, China's political risk is higher than that of the 23 other countries but comparable to the overall world political risk (where a lower rating indicates greater risk). China's economic risk is similar to our 23 local countries' economic risk average, while overall world economic risk is slightly higher. China's financial risk is also lower than its economic risk and local and world financial risk. 
Hypotheses and methodology
The home bias literature shows that investors typically hold portfolios that are overweighted towards their home market, which suggests that the Chinese will invest mainly in Chinese-domiciled assets. However, certain factors may encourage the Chinese to invest offshore. In particular, in a spirit similar to the notion of 'push' and 'pull' factors in the capital flow literature (e.g. Calvo et al. 1993 Calvo et al. , 1996 Fernandez-Arias 1996; Chuhan et al. 1998; Fratzscher 2012) , when there are fewer expected growth opportunities in China, the Chinese may seek offshore investment opportunities, including residential property. As motivation for overseas property investments, Newell and Worzala (1995) report that investors in a survey state 'lack of opportunities in domestic market' and 'higher returns than domestic markets' as key factors. Therefore, we predict that the Chinese will buy more overseas properties when 7 We use "China" or "Chinese" as key words to obtain the total number of stories about China from Bloomberg. We add "risk" or "uncertainty" or "peril" as additional key words to obtain the total number of risk stories for China from Bloomberg. By the same method, we obtain the corresponding story counts for the world and other countries.
expected growth opportunities in China are fewer, which would lead to faster real housing price growth (hpg) of overseas real estate markets. We call this the overseas opportunity hypothesis. To test this prediction, we empirically estimate the following model:
hpgj,t = a0 + a1*China's expected growth opportunitiest + Controlsj,t + ej,t
where the subscripts j and t index the country and quarter, respectively. We expect a1 to be negative. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) show that the GDP is fairly strongly associated with consumer confidence in expected macroeconomic conditions, a major determinant of growth opportunities. Therefore, we use the average of the real GDP growth of the past four quarters as a proxy for expected growth opportunities. In place of real GDP growth, we also use the interest rate and consumer expectations as alternative proxies for robustness checks.
The controls of the baseline model include lagged real housing price growth, real personal disposable income growth, the past real GDP growth of the local economy and the world, and country fixed effects. 8 We estimate robust standard errors based on country and time clustering. The additional controls of an augmented model are growth of the construction production index, of the rental index, of the unemployment rate, of the consumer confidence index, of the exchange rate, of household debt, and of the interest rate. 9 To minimize the influence of outliers, the variables of all the regressions are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 8 The controls are based on demand fundamentals in the housing market such as employment and income (Wheaton and Nechayev 2008; Campbell et al. 2009 ). We include lagged housing price growth to control for return persistence found in the housing market (Case and Shiller 1989) . Based on DiPasquale and Wheaton's model (1992), GDP growth should be significantly correlated to housing market demand. We add the world GDP growth to control for a general globalization effect on local housing markets. 9 Adding the interest rate and rent in the model will control for housing market investment opportunities. Shiller (2006) argues that house prices should be equal to the present value of future rents. Glaeser et al. (2005) 
We consider three alternative fund measures: the savings rate, aggregate wealth, and wealth per adult. We subsequently focus on the savings rate because we only have data on the latter two measures since year 2000. We predict a positive a2. Since Chinese participants in overseas property markets are likely to be in the upper-middle class or higher because of the relatively high minimum investment outlay, the ideal proxy should capture this group's market terms are used to analyse the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis (e.g. Wheaton and Nechayev 2008; Khandani et al. 2009; Glaeser et al. 2010 ). The exchange rate may be relevant for international investors, since changes of the exchange rate will have a material impact on foreign investment. Thus, it could have predictive power in our analysis (Chen et al. 2010) . Finally, the consumer confidence index is based on the exuberance theory proposed by Akerlof and Shiller (2009) , to counter for the recent bubble period.
investible funds. We therefore use the growth of the product of an existing investible funds measure and the Gini index. Larger Gini measures imply greater income inequality within a nation, thereby capturing the ability to accumulate savings and wealth of those in or above the upper-middle classes.
Concerning our third hypothesis, risk is a primary consideration of any investment expect an increase in risk in China will increase overseas property investments by the Chinese, thus accelerating the growth of foreign housing prices. We call this risk hypothesis. We thus augment Eq. (2) as follows:
hpgj,t = a0 + a1*China's expected growth opportunitiest + a2*growth of China's investible fundst + a3*China's riskt
The prediction is that a3 is positive. We have four Chinese risk measures: political, economic, and financial risk ratings and the proportion of risk or uncertainty stories, estimated as the ratio of the number of risk and uncertainty stories to the number of all stories. Since the ratings are inverse risk measures, their coefficients are expected to be negative. We simultaneously incorporate these different risk measures and use local risk counterparts as new controls. We also include global risk controls because foreign housing markets are integral parts of the world.
As our final hypothesis, China's effects predicted by the three hypotheses above are 
If a familiarity/attractiveness attribute strengthens (weakens) the Chinese effects, a1m will be negative (positive) and a2m and a3m positive (negative). The main effects of the familiarity/attractiveness attributes are not incorporated for a more parsimonious model because either there is no main standalone effect or the main standalone effect cannot be estimated with country fixed effects.
The attributes we consider sequentially and cumulatively are the correlation between China's interest rate and the growth of overseas housing prices (reflecting diversification benefits), primary languages, and quality of higher education. Modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1952) states that whether we add an asset to an existing portfolio depends on the asset's incremental risk effect on the portfolio. If the asset is strongly positively (weakly) correlated with the portfolio, there is little (more) room for risk reduction. Therefore, an investor is more likely to invest in an asset if its correlation with the investor's existing portfolio is lower. The return series of the Chinese portfolio is not readily available. However, as the home bias literature suggests, the Chinese likely mainly hold assets in China. It is thus plausible to use a series that reasonably tracks changes of the returns of Chinese assets over time as a proxy for the return series of the Chinese portfolio. In particular, we use the prime lending rate. 10 We have two correlation measures: correlation based on all noncontemporaneous observations and correlation for odd (even) quarters based on even (odd) quarter observations.
Since English is a principal international language, we expect the Chinese to be more familiar with countries where English is the primary language (English countries). We also predict that the benefits associated with English make these countries more attractive to the Chinese. Hence, real estate in English countries will be more appealing to the Chinese. The
Chinese effects on housing price growth will thus be stronger among these countries. We also have two English measures: a dummy for countries where English is the primary language (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and a 10 Several Chinese interest rate series (short-, medium-, and long-term major loan rates, a discount rate, and the prime lending rate) are highly correlated, with coefficients above 0.99.
dummy for countries where English is the de facto official and primary language (Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
A primary reason for overseas property purchases by the Chinese is for their children's education and migration (e.g. Bradsher and Searcey 2015; Juwai 2016). Therefore, we predict that the Chinese effects are more prevalent for countries with better education. Our two measures of higher education quality are the 2016 QS higher education country-level ranking and a dummy for the 2013 top five tertiary student migration destinations of China. These five countries are the United States, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea.
We also look at bilateral trade, Chinese outward foreign direct investment, Chinese migration numbers, the overseas Chinese population and Chinese outbound tourists, geographical distance, and the long-term growth forecasts of the foreign economies. 11
However, these have neither explanatory power nor moderating effects. There are three possible explanations. First, these variables are not good proxies of the relevant familiarity/attractiveness. Second, the data quality is poor. Third, there is no relation along these dimensions.
Empirical results

Main relations
We first graphically show the relations between housing price growth in international markets and growth in the Chinese GDP and wealth. Figure 1A plots China's GDP growth and the housing price growth of North America, Japan, and the aggregate of the 23 countries. The series are four-quarter moving averages. It is evident that China's GDP growth is negatively correlated with aggregate and North American housing price growth, but not with Japanese housing price growth. In Figure 1B , we replace China's GDP growth in Figure 1A by its wealth growth, where wealth is the product of the total wealth and the Gini index. It is clear that China's wealth growth is fairly strongly positively correlated with the aggregate and North
American housing price growth, but not with Japan's. Table 3 reports the regression results of the relation between China's rolling average real quarterly GDP growth over the past four quarters (past GDP growth) and the housing price growth of the other markets around the world. The coefficient of China's past GDP growth is significantly negative. This result is consistent with the overseas opportunity hypothesis, that when China's growth opportunities are poorer, the Chinese buy more overseas properties, whereby increasing the growth of these markets' housing prices. 12 12 We regress China's real housing price index growth on China's contemporaneous or lagged real GDP growth. The coefficient of the GDP growth is significantly positive. When we replace the above GDP growth by the average of the GDP growth over the past four quarters, the coefficient is still positive but weaker. These results are consistent with the view that lower GDP growth in China reflects a lack of investment opportunities in China's domestic market, including the domestic property market, consistent with the overseas opportunity hypothesis.
Effects of China's GDP growth
The result is robust with respect to the inclusion of various controls, as shown in columns (1) to (3) of We perform several other robustness checks. 14 First, instead of using the past four quarters, we look at China's GDP growth based on past the one-, two-, and 12-quarter intervals. All alternative intervals of past GDP growth have significantly negative relations with overseas housing price growth. The longer the past GDP growth interval, the larger the estimated coefficients. The magnitude of the coefficient for 12-quarter GDP growth (-0.115) is approximately double the one-quarter coefficient (-0.056). Second, in place of past China's GDP growth, we consider China's consumer expectations based on the past one, two, three, and four quarters. In all cases, the relations with foreign housing price growth are significantly negative. Lastly, we replace China's past GDP growth by China's past prime lending rate. We obtain strongly statistically significant and qualitatively the same results. Interestingly, the
In addition, consistent with the investible funds hypothesis, we find that Chinese property market returns are significantly and positively correlated with our measures of wealth or investible funds with Chinese investors. 13 The start date varies across countries, depending on data availability. 14 These results are not tabulated but are available from the authors upon request.
magnitude of the estimated coefficient of China's prime lending rate (-0.086) is very close to that of China's GDP growth. As for the local country risk measures, the coefficient of the economic risk rating is positive and strongly significant at the 1% level, suggesting higher housing price growth when the local economy is more stable. With regard to the world risk measures, the financial rating has a significantly positive coefficient, whereas the proportion of risk stories has a strongly the interaction between the correlation and China's economic risk rating is also significantly 19 We thank Richard Taffler for the suggestions of controlling for the Chinese stock market and housing bubbles. These results are not tabulated but are available from the authors upon request. 20 The effect of the growth of China's investible funds becomes the coefficient of investible fund growth itself plus the coefficient of the interaction with the correlation and the investible fund growth.
Effects of China's changes in saving or wealth growth
Effects of China's risk
negative. This finding suggests housing prices grow faster when China experiences better economic stability and the correlation between China's interest rate and local housing price growth is lower. This can be understood as follows. When China is more economically stable, Chinese people will have stronger incentive to invest at home. Hence, during these times, only those foreign housing markets with higher diversification benefits will attract more Chinese purchases in relation to those markets with lower diversification benefits. The remaining correlation interactions are not robustly significant.
Differential Chinese effects for English countries
The second attribute we consider is the English language. As shown in Table 8 , consistent with expectations, we find that the dummies for English countries interacted with China's past GDP growth and with the change in China's savings rate are significantly stronger and have the same signs as these Chinese variables before. These results correspondingly show more pronounced Chinese GDP growth and investible funds effects for English than for non-English countries. There is no significant incremental Chinese risk effect on the housing price growth of English over non-English countries. Table 9 reports the moderation of the Chinese effects by the education quality in the overseas market. The interaction between education and China's political risk rating is negative. This finding suggests that, when China is more politically unstable, the overseas housing markets of countries with higher-quality education are more attractive to the Chinese, who then probably purchase more in these markets and housing prices grow faster. Hence, education magnifies China's political risk effects on housing price growth. On the other hand, the interaction between education and China's economic risk rating is significantly positive.
Education matters
Hence, education strengthens the Chinese effects on overseas housing price growth when
China is more economically stable, thereby enabling the Chinese buyers to generate more funds. The remaining educational interaction terms are insignificant at the standard levels.
Plausibly, English countries and countries with better education also have non-English language and non-educational characteristics attractive to Chinese buyers. One obvious candidate is those attributes associated with the level of economic development. Therefore, we examine whether measures of economic development replicate the English language and education results. In particular, we look at two such measures: a dummy for the G7 and the real GDP per capita. We find that the results do not reproduce the English and education results. Hence, the latter are unlikely to be driven by attributes associated with developed economies.
Conclusions
Using In Figure 1A , China's GDP growth is the average of that of the past four quarters; the housing price growth is the average of that of the contemporaneous and the past three quarters. North America consists of Canada and the United States, weighted by the GDP purchasing power parity per capita. In Figure 1B , China's wealth is the product of total wealth and the Gini coefficient; housing price growth is the average quarterly growth of the four quarters in a year. 
